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Not to put too fine a point on it:  Professor Lininger1 thinks Pro-
fessor Rhode2 wimps out.  Her “heart is in the right place,” but she 
too readily draws back from proposing mandatory pro bono service.3  
In this brief response, I want to up the ante.  If Professor Lininger 
thinks Professor Rhode is a wimp, I think they’re both hopeless goo-
goos.4  We currently have a system of civil rights enforcement that 
harnesses the profit motive of plaintiffs’ attorneys to encourage the 
prosecution of violations of civil rights laws.  That system may seem 
crass and disreputable to those who believe that lawyers should bring 
civil rights actions out of the goodness of their hearts (perhaps while 
singing “Kumbaya” or, for those of a more lefty persuasion, “If I Had 
a Hammer”).  But it’s the best system of civil rights enforcement 
we’ve found. 
Unfortunately—and this is a point to which neither Professor 
Lininger nor Professor Rhode give any real attention—a system of 
mandatory pro bono may undermine that system.  It may do so, 
moreover, without providing significant countervailing benefits for 
civil rights enforcement.  The implications of this analysis extend be-
yond the narrow context of civil rights litigation.  The lessons one 
can draw from that context suggest that pro bono—mandatory or oth-
erwise—ought not to be the major focus of any effort to improve le-
gal services for disadvantaged people. 
 
*  Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.  Thanks to the Northwestern University 
Law Review for inviting me to submit this essay, and to my colleagues at Washington University with 
whom I’ve had so many productive conversations about these issues, especially Susan Appleton, Re-
becca Hollander-Blumoff, Pauline Kim, Kent Syverud, and (as always) Margo Schlanger. 
1  Tom Lininger, From Park Place to Community Chest:  Rethinking Lawyers’ Monopoly, 101 NW. 
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), 101 NW. U. L. REV COLLOQUY 155 (2007), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/12/ (citations infra refer to the Colloquy) 
(link).  
2  DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE:  PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE 
PROFESSIONS (2005). 
3  Lininger, supra note 1, at 171. 
4  A reader has suggested that I define “goo-goo.”  I trust the term needs no explanation for readers 
of a law journal based in Chicago.  For those who need further enlightenment, see the collected columns 
of Mike Royko. 
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I. THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL SYSTEM AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
ENFORCEMENT 
Civil rights laws don’t enforce themselves.5  Although some dis-
criminatory acts occur because of the simple inertia of longstanding 
and unquestioned practices, most people who discriminate do so ei-
ther because they want to, because of cognitive bias, or because it is 
rational for them to do so.6  Without a meaningful threat of enforce-
ment, those discriminators are unlikely to comply with a law that 
bans discrimination.  The threat of enforcement encourages individu-
als to cease discriminating and organizations to root out and counter-
act the (perhaps unconscious) discrimination that occurs within their 
ranks. 
But finding an effective means of enforcement is difficult.  Indi-
viduals whose rights are violated are unlikely to reliably carry the en-
forcement load on their own.  For one thing, enforcement of civil 
rights laws is in significant respects a public good.  Because civil 
rights laws tend to protect against class-based discrimination, a single 
civil rights claimant necessarily vindicates not just her own interests 
but also the interests of others in her class.7  Any given successful 
civil rights claimant cannot appropriate all of the benefits of her suc-
cess, so she will have an insufficient incentive to pursue the level of 
enforcement that most benefits her class. 
Moreover, civil rights enforcement is expensive, time consum-
ing, and technical.8  Even in cases that are relatively easy on the mer-
its, civil rights claimants often must present expert testimony, which 
they and their lawyers may have difficulty locating and paying for.9  
And—whether because of statutory limitations or because of the 
Eleventh Amendment—many civil rights laws authorize only injunc-
tive relief and thereby make it impossible for civil rights claimants to 
entice attorneys with the prospect of a contingent fee. 
One might think that public interest groups, or private attorneys 




5  My discussion focuses on civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination, but the point applies, with 
minor modifications, to broader civil rights laws, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
6  On cognitive bias, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimi-
nation Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5–10 (2006) (link).  On rational discrimination, see generally Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 
VA. L. REV. 825 (2003). 
7  For the now-classic statement of the point, see Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 
401–02 (1968) (link). 
8  On the technical aspects of civil rights litigation, with a focus on the disability rights context, see 
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies:  The Case of “Abusive” ADA 
Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2006). 
9  See, e.g., Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation Revolu-
tion, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 2000 n.98 (2004) (link). 
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bar.  But they do not.  “[M]ost civil rights litigation is not brought by 
institutional litigators or by large firms engaging in pro bono activ-
ity,” but by individual lawyers who are trying to make a living.10  
Public interest organizations tend to focus on the few large-scale law 
reform cases at the expense of the important day-to-day enforcement 
work of individual cases.11  And pro bono is very rarely deployed for 
civil rights cases—particularly civil rights cases against businesses.12
Market-based private enforcement of civil rights therefore seems 
like it will be insufficient to serve the public interest reflected in civil 
rights statutes.  Because they create a public good, and indeed are the 
prototypical location for “public interest” law, perhaps civil rights 
laws should be enforced by the government.  And indeed, our civil 
rights laws authorize government enforcement in a couple of ways:  
government-initiated litigation and administrative enforcement bu-
reaucracies.  But public enforcement has significant limitations as 
well. 
Most important, public enforcement is constrained by politics.  
An incumbent administration may have no room on its agenda for—
and indeed may be downright hostile to—vigorous enforcement of 
civil rights laws (or some subset of those laws).13  Even if an admini-
stration is committed to civil rights, it will be unlikely to pursue le-
gally sound but politically touchy enforcement actions.  And in every 
case an administration must weigh the cost of expending political 
capital against the value of reserving that capital for use on other pro-
jects of importance to it. 
In response to these limitations of purely private and purely pub-
lic enforcement, Congress has developed a hybrid model of civil 
rights law enforcement—public enforcement, supplemented by “pri-
vate attorneys general.”  The private attorney general is an individual 
whose rights have been violated and who, based on that violation, ini-




10  Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation:  The Influ-
ence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 768 
(1988). 
11  See, e.g., Christine Jolls, The Role and Functioning of Public-Interest Legal Organizations in the 
Enforcement of the Employment Laws, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 141, 162–64 (Richard B. Freeman et al. eds., 2005). 
12  See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 116–23 (2004) 
(link) (showing that “[d]ecisions about pro bono are . . . always filtered through the lens of how they will 
affect the interests of commercial clients”); Norman W. Spaulding, The Prophet and the Bureaucrat:  
Positional Conflicts in Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1395, 1414 (1998) (listing “envi-
ronmental law, labor and employment law, and landlord/tenant law” as areas in which private firms of-
ten refuse to do pro bono); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and American-Style Civil 
Legal Assistance, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 79, 80 (2007) (arguing that the American pro bono system puts 
legal assistance for poor people at the mercy of market forces). 
13  See, e.g., William R. Yeomans, An Uncivil Division, LEGAL AFF., Sept./Oct. 2005, at 20 (link). 
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compliance with the law.14  And “the fuel that drives the private at-
torney general engine” is fee shifting.15  To give private lawyers an 
incentive to take private attorney general suits, Congress has pro-
vided that prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees 
from the defendants they defeat.  Litigation under civil rights statutes 
serves as the paradigmatic example of a private attorney general ac-
tion. 
This system has its flaws.  Private attorneys general lack the re-
sources that the government could bring to bear in civil rights litiga-
tion.  Moreover, over the past 20 years the Supreme Court has cut 
back on defendants’ responsibility to pay plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.  
The Court has, for example, held in Buckhannon Board & Care 
Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Re-
sources that a plaintiff is not a “prevailing party,” and therefore can-
not recover fees, if her lawsuit merely spurs the defendant to abandon 
the challenged practice voluntarily, without a judgment, consent de-
cree, or similar judicial order.16  If a would-be customer with a dis-
ability sues an inaccessible restaurant under the ADA, for example, 
and the lawsuit spurs the restaurant to build a ramp to its front door 
before the court can issue a final judgment, the plaintiff will recover 
no attorneys’ fees.  The Buckhannon rule, in other words, deprives 
plaintiffs’ counsel of fees if she wins too easily.  The Court has also 
held that the “reasonable” attorneys’ fee the defendant must pay 
should be based on the hourly rate of lawyers who represent fee-
paying clients in comparable cases, with no enhancement for the risk 
of loss.17  Because plaintiffs’ counsel in fee-shifting cases get paid 
only if they win, paying them the same hourly rate as lawyers who 
get paid whether they win or lose creates a disincentive to take these 
cases.  And the Court has also permitted defendants to offer settle-
ments that are conditioned on the plaintiff’s counsel not receiving 
fees.18  That rule may be thought, from an ex post perspective, to en-




14  For a discussion of the many things we mean when we talk about “private attorneys general,” see 
William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 2129 (2004) (link). 
15  Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 205 (link). 
16  See 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (link).  For an initial empirical investigation into the limitations Buck-
hannon has placed on civil rights litigation, see Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Pro-
cedural Attack on Civil Rights:  The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 
54 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (link).  Albiston and Nielsen discuss a number of scenarios in 
which defendants can, by strategic capitulation, use Buckhannon to deny plaintiffs attorneys’ fees.  Id. at 
17–29. 
17  See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992) (link). 
18  See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 741–43 (1986) (link). 
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so at the cost of discouraging lawyers from taking these cases in the 
first place. 
These legal rules do limit the effectiveness of the private attorney 
general system.  But even with those limitations, private attorneys 
general remain essential to assuring that civil rights laws are at all 
meaningfully enforced.  To the extent that mandatory pro bono would 
undermine the private attorney general system, that should be marked 
down as a significant cost. 
II. WHY MANDATORY PRO BONO WOULD LIKELY UNDERMINE 
THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL SYSTEM 
One might think that adopting a mandatory pro bono policy 
would necessarily increase the resources available for civil rights en-
forcement.  Although he does not focus on civil rights work, Profes-
sor Lininger certainly seems to assume that a mandatory pro bono 
regime will have significant benefits for disadvantaged people.  Man-
datory pro bono, the optimistic story goes, will open up a whole new 
pool of lawyers who will aid people of limited means.  If even some 
of the lawyers in that pool do civil rights work, that has to enhance 
civil rights enforcement, no? 
No.  There are two significant problems with the optimistic story.  
First, there is no reason to think that significant numbers of new law-
yers will do civil rights work if pro bono is made mandatory—and 
there are lots of reasons to think they will not.  As numerous com-
mentators have noted—and Professor Lininger doesn’t really deny—
civil rights work is a comparatively small part of private-firm pro 
bono practice.  Little pro bono work goes to social-change-oriented 
lawyering in any event.19  There are a number of reasons for this state 
of affairs.  For one thing, civil rights work often challenges powerful 
institutions—institutions that are often the clients of private law 
firms.  (That is why when private firms do bring pro bono civil rights 
cases, they tend to bring them against state and local governments—
who have their own in-house attorneys—rather than against private 
corporations for whose business they might compete.20)  For another 
thing, civil rights laws are complex and technical; it is impossible to 




19  See supra note 12.  This has been true for decades.  See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER ET AL., LAWYERS 
AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS 94 (1978). 
20  When private (particularly large-firm) pro bono counsel do bring civil rights cases against gov-
ernments, they can raise courts’ expectations about the scale and sophistication of litigation in ways that 
do not necessarily make it easier for the civil rights bar to litigate successfully.  See Margo Schlanger, 
Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time:  A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
550, 616–21 (2006) (link).  But following that point would take me far beyond my project here. 
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even in the 120 hours per three years that Professor Lininger sug-
gests21). 
So long as other pro bono options remain—and they certainly 
will22—there is no reason to think that mandating pro bono will over-
come these obstacles that prevent more lawyers from performing 
civil rights work.  Civil rights cases will continue to threaten estab-
lished interests, and they will continue to raise highly technical is-
sues.  Some new lawyers will surely take on civil rights work, but 
there is no reason to believe that very many will.  And if mandatory 
pro bono generates new work for civil rights plaintiffs, it will also 
generate new work for organizations that oppose civil rights remedi-
es23—whether because lawyers who do not currently perform pro 
bono work have more conservative views or because the new man-
date provokes a backlash. 
Still, even a minor increase in civil rights litigation might be a 
good thing.  If even some new lawyers take on civil rights pro bono, 
and any backlash effects can be contained, mandatory pro bono could 
be a net plus for civil rights enforcement.  But that is only until we 
get to the second problem:  A mandatory pro bono regime is likely to 
encourage courts to make rulings that undermine the private attorney 
general system. 
Because the private attorney general system is essential to civil 
rights enforcement, and fee shifting is the engine that drives the sys-
tem, judicial rulings regarding the availability of statutory attorneys’ 
fees are likely to have extremely significant effects on the vindication 
of civil rights in practice.  The biggest obstacle to that system is the 
view, widespread among federal judges, that civil rights litigation “is 
not part and parcel of ordinary practice, but is more in the nature of 
charity or volunteer work.”24  Thus, when the Court barred recovery 
of attorneys’ fees for optional administrative proceedings, it brushed 
aside any concern that its ruling would deprive civil rights plaintiffs 
of representation in a forum that may afford effective relief without 
litigation:  “[C]ompetent counsel will be motivated by the interests of 




21  See Lininger, supra note 1, at 172-73. 
22  See RHODE, supra note 2, at 172 (“[W]henever bar discussions turn to pro bono requirements, 
‘two things happen; the definition expands and the number of hours decline[s].’”) (citation omitted); 
Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases:  The Wrong Answer to the Right Question, 49 
MD. L. REV. 78, 100 (1990) (“Experience demonstrates that the political compromises involved in se-
curing approval of such a program will result in a definition of pro bono service so broad that it encom-
passes activities already undertaken by virtually all lawyers.”). 
23  See generally Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest Over the Meaning of 
“Public Interest Law,” 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223 (2005). 
24  Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights:  The Supreme Court, Congress, 
and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291, 373 (1990). 
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able and counsel believes that they may prove successful.”25  An in-
terpretation of § 1988 cannot be based on the assumption that “an at-
torney would advise the client to forgo an available avenue of relief 
solely because § 1988 does not provide for attorney’s fees . . . .”26
Similarly, in Evans v. Jeff D., the Court stated that plaintiffs’ 
counsel would face no “ethical dilemma” when presented with a set-
tlement offer that denied them attorneys’ fees, because a lawyer’s 
“ethical duty [is] to serve his clients loyally and competently.”27  And 
in Marek v. Chesny,28 the Court also disregarded any concern with 
conflicts of interest when it adopted a rule that might give plaintiffs’ 
lawyers an incentive to accept a settlement offer rather than risk their 
attorneys’ fees.  As Dean Brand has argued, these rulings rest on “a 
deeply held view that public interest lawyers . . . should not be sub-
ject to the same economic pressures as other practicing lawyers.”29  
Because the Justices believe that civil rights lawyers should not 
worry about collecting their fees, these decisions approve regimes in 
which serving their clients’ interests often requires those lawyers to 
forego compensation.  Buckhannon, which assumes that lawyers will 
bring civil rights cases even if defendants can deny them fees simply 
by giving the plaintiffs everything they want, rests on a similar as-
sumption.30
This view of civil rights litigation as charity is not limited to the 
Supreme Court.  As I have shown, lower federal courts have fre-
quently exhibited that view when considering cases brought under the 
public accommodations provisions of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act.  Judges in those cases have routinely criticized plaintiffs’ law-
yers for seeking the “reasonable” attorneys’ fees the law authorizes—
even though it is typically clear that the defendant business has been 
violating the law for years, and that the plaintiff’s suit was a neces-
sary spur to compliance.  For these courts, the concern that civil 
rights lawyers unduly care about earning their fees seems to take 
precedence over any concern with preventing and deterring violations 




25  N.C. Dep’t of Transp. v. Crest St. Cmty. Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 14–15 (1986) (link) (quoting 
Webb v. County Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 241 n.15 (1985)). 
26  Id. 
27  475 U.S. 717, 727–28 (1986) (link). 
28  473 U.S. 1 (1985) (link). 
29  Brand, supra note 24, at 373. 
30  Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 
608–09 (2001) (link).  The initial empirical work of Professors Albiston and Nielsen suggests, not sur-
prisingly, that the Court’s assumption was erroneous.  See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 16. 
31  For a more extensive discussion of the issues addressed in this paragraph, see generally Bagen-
stos, supra note 8. 
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Unfortunately, adopting a mandatory pro bono rule would likely 
exacerbate these problems.  Such a rule would further entrench the 
sharp line lawyers and judges draw between “public interest” repre-
sentation—which is understood to be provided at below-market com-
pensation—and ordinary practice.  As Professor Pearce has shown, 
the rise of public interest law practice and voluntary pro bono prac-
tice undertaken by private attorneys has already had such an effect.32  
But the countervailing benefits of the rise of the public interest bar 
have been enormous.  Without public interest lawyers, the legal needs 
of people without means or power would be immensely underserved.  
The existence of voluntary pro bono may have had a similarly posi-
tive effect—though I am not aware of any study weighing the costs 
and benefits—but there is, as I have suggested, especially little reason 
to believe that mandatory pro bono would have such an effect. 
To the extent that a new mandatory pro bono duty is justified—
as Professor Lininger justifies it33—as enforcing an ethical obligation 
for lawyers to help the needy, imposing such a duty can only exacer-
bate the judicial stinginess in awarding attorneys’ fees.34  (That large 
firms from time to time use pro bono hours for fee-shifting cases and 
seek fees themselves35 will not help things.)  Federal judges, who are 
inclined to think of for-profit civil rights litigation as a necessary evil, 
will not find it so necessary to protect the fee-shifting mechanism 
when every lawyer is required to perform charitable work.  Although 
there is no reason to believe that lawyers will move to pro bono civil 
rights work in significant numbers, judges already have the view that 
civil rights work should be performed as a charitable service.  The 
new mandate will only encourage them in the belief that lawyering 
for the public interest is a form of charity, and it may lead them to 
tighten the rules for statutory attorneys’ fees even further.  The result, 




32  See Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class:  The Formation and Dissolution 
of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 
417–20 (2001); see also Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2087, 2116–
17 (2004) (link). 
33  See Lininger, supra note 1, at 178-79. 
34  It is notable in this regard that one of the Reagan Administration’s proposals for restricting attor-
neys’ fees would have denied statutory fees “in cases handled by private attorneys representing indigent 
clients or public interest organizations on a pro bono basis.”  Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public Interest Litigation, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 
1984, at 233, 242. 
35  See William A. Bradford, Jr., Private Enforcement of Public Rights:  The Role of Fee-Shifting 
Statutes in Pro Bono Lawyering, in THE LAW FIRM AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 126, 130–31 (Robert A. 
Katzmann ed., 1995) (encouraging firms with institutionalized pro bono programs to take cases and do-
nate any fee awards to the referring public interest organization). 
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III. LESSONS 
My argument in this essay has been based on intuition and ex-
perience (my own and others’).  It has not been based on any rigorous 
model or empirical investigation.  My goal has been simply to sug-
gest one possible consequence of mandatory pro bono to which Pro-
fessor Lininger does not attend—the prospect that mandatory pro 
bono may actually hurt civil rights plaintiffs by encouraging federal 
courts to be even stingier in their attorneys’ fee awards.  Like any 
perverse-effects argument, this one requires careful empirical exami-
nation before being endorsed or rejected.36  But the argument can 
hardly be dismissed outright; the view that civil rights litigation 
should be provided as a form of charity is too entrenched, and the 
fee-recovery limitations imposed by courts in the service of that vi-
sion are too well documented.  The proposal for mandatory pro bono 
is no doubt well intended, but it appears likely to impose significant 
costs on potential civil rights plaintiffs without much countervailing 
benefit to them. 
A supporter of mandatory pro bono might respond in the nature 
of confession and avoidance.  The goal of mandatory pro bono is not 
to expand civil rights litigation, one might say; the goal is to expand 
access to lawyers for people without the means to pay for them.  In 
particular, the goal is to give people of limited means access to the 
kind of mundane, day-to-day legal services (estate planning, living 
wills, divorces, landlord-tenant, etc.) that are essential to ordinary life 
in our advanced capitalist system.  If that is the goal, and mandatory 
pro bono does increase the number of hours in which lawyers provide 
those sorts of legal services to the poor, advocates may regard the 
likely effects on civil rights litigation as a regrettable cost, but one 
worth paying. 
But my discussion should have troubling implications even for 
mandatory pro bono supporters who simply do not care about civil 
rights litigation.  Adopting a mandatory pro bono rule is likely to re-
lieve the political pressure to make meaningful changes to poor peo-
ple’s access to legal services, but it will not materially improve 
access to justice.  This is particularly true given that lawyers will in-
evitably be permitted to spend pro bono hours on work that promises 
no direct benefit to poor people—and that private lawyers will in any 
event shy away from cases that challenge fundamental institutional 
structures of oppression and disempowerment.  Basically nobody—
certainly not Professor Rhode or Professor Lininger, judging from 




36  Cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the Americans with Disabilities Act Reduced Employment for Peo-
ple with Disabilities?, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 527, 559 (2004) (making this point about per-
verse-effects arguments generally). 
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to meeting the legal service needs of people with limited means.37  
Those needs can probably only be met by taking a couple of steps:  
making a significant financial investment (paid for through taxes or 
other government revenues, as well as expanded fee shifting) and re-
laxing the unauthorized-practice-of-law bar that prevents nonlawyers 
from performing many routine services that can be competently per-
formed without legal training.38  Mandatory pro bono will likely 
make it harder to obtain political support for these steps. 
In short, I might say the same thing about Professor Lininger that 
he says about Professor Rhode.  His heart is in the right place.  But 
the mandatory pro bono policy he supports is just another typical 
“good government” intervention:  By enlisting the noblesse oblige of 
lawyers and encouraging them to provide charity to the “unfortu-
nate,” it lets them believe that they are doing something about the 
disadvantages that attach to poverty in this country.  But in the end, 
the policy is likely to do little to change or remove those disadvan-





37  See Rob Atkinson, A Social-Democratic Critique of Pro Bono Publico Representation of the 
Poor:  The Good as the Enemy of the Best, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 129, 146 n.68 (2001) 
(link) (“As a practical matter, no mandatory pro bono program offers any real hope of actually coming 
anywhere close to meeting the legal needs of the poor.”). 
38  For a similar argument, see id.  Professors Silver and Cross oppose mandatory pro bono on the 
dual grounds that fee-paid lawyers do a public service and poor people need legal services far less than 
they need money.  See Charles Silver & Frank B. Cross, What’s Not To Like About Being A Lawyer?, 
109 YALE L.J. 1443, 1477–93 (2000).  Like them, I am uncomfortable with treating legal services for 
poor people as charity; unlike them, I think legal services are an important need for many poor people. 
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